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Abstract 
We consider spectrum sharing between a limited set of operators having similar rights for accessing spectrum. A 
coordination protocol acting on the level of the Radio Access Network (RAN) is designed. The protocol is non-
cooperative, but assumes an agreement to a set of negotiation rules. The signaling overhead is low, and 
knowledge of competitor’s channel state information is not assumed. No monetary transactions are involved; 
instead, spectrum sharing is based on a RAN-internal virtual currency. The protocol is applicable in a scenario 
of mutual renting and when the operators form a spectrum pool. The protocol is reactive to variations in 
interference and load of the operators, and shows gains in a simulated small cell scenario compared to not using 
any coordination protocol.  
I. Introduction 
In state-of-the-art mobile communication, dedicated and exclusive spectrum access coupled with unlicensed 
local area solutions is the mainstream approach that national regulatory authorities use to allocate new spectrum. 
In exclusive access, only one operator has the right to use a dedicated licensed frequency band according to 
specific rules. Though exclusive spectrum access will certainly be needed in 5G mobile systems to guarantee 
Quality-of-Service (QoS) in wide area Radio Access Networks (RANs), other regulatory options may be needed 
in addition. Especially at carrier frequencies above 6 GHz, and in small cell networks, exclusive access may 
result in low spectrum utilization efficiency. Unlicensed access, on the contrary, offers unpredictable QoS. 
Enabling the high capacity and flexible usage envisioned for 5G systems thus calls for more flexible regulatory 
regimes where, e.g., operators may operate across various frequency bands with different authorization modes 
[1]. 
Co-Primary Shared Access is a complementary new alternative for spectrum sharing, where multiple operators 
jointly use a part (or the whole) of their licensed spectrum [1,2]. The most relevant Co-Primary Shared Access 
scenarios are Mutual Renting (MR) and Limited Spectrum Pool (LSP). In MR, operators have individual 
licenses to access exclusive frequency bands, and are mutually allowed to rent parts of their licensed resources 
to their peers upon request. In LSP, a group license is given to an operator for using a common pool of spectral 
resources, which is shared with a limited set of operators that have equal access rights. As the set of peer 
operators and the principles of spectrum usage are known beforehand, investment decisions under Co-Primary 
Shared Access have lower risk because the long-term share of resources can have a predictable minimum value 
[2].   
Joint use of licensed spectrum among operators can be realized either orthogonally in time [3], frequency [4,5] 
or space, or non-orthogonally [6,5]. In cooperative orthogonal time domain sharing, operators with a low load 
can borrow their time-slots to heavily loaded operators, helping them to reduce blocking probability and frame 
delay [3]. An upper bound for the sum capacity of a two operator orthogonal frequency domain sharing scenario 
is found in [4], where operators have full access to User Equipment (UE)-specific channel quality indicators of 
all shared channels to perform coordinated scheduling. In [5], orthogonal sharing based on pairwise exchange of 
resource blocks between two operators is considered.  
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In non-orthogonal spectrum sharing, operators simultaneously use a common block of spectral resources, 
creating inter-operator interference. In [6], a cooperative game approach is proposed, which converges quickly 
to a value close to the Nash bargaining solution; however, it requires full knowledge of action profiles in the 
neighborhood of the node. Non-orthogonal inter-operator spectrum sharing in the spatial domain has been 
considered in [5], where Channel State Information (CSI) is exchanged among operators to implement 
coordinated transmit beamforming and steer their antenna beams towards the most convenient direction. In all 
these studies, the operators benefit from cooperative spectrum sharing; however, they need to reveal proprietary 
information to their competitors [5,6] or to a central entity [3,4].  
Operators are competitors in nature and, therefore, the rationale to make them cooperate would be either a legal 
framework or self-interest. In such settings, there is no reason to assume that operators are willing to exchange 
proprietary information with their competitors. Moreover, operators provide differentiated services to their 
customers, with objectives that can be categorically different according to their business models. Thus, the 
optimization of a joint utility by a central entity is not realistic. Co-primary spectrum sharing between operators 
is thus characterized by the operators not knowing each other’s optimization target or network states.  
Spectrum sharing can be realized by monetizing spectrum usage, and arranging auctions to determine the 
spectrum management [7]. Here we are interested in adaptive spectrum use on a short timescale, e.g., related to 
cell load variations and changing inter-operator interference conditions. It is a non-trivial task to design efficient 
auction mechanisms for a limited area for a limited time, and to couple operator auction strategies to their 
income model. Implementing auctions also requires the involvement of a trusted third party with substantial 
accounting infrastructure to collect bids, track payments, etc. This adds inertia to moving towards auction-based 
spectrum sharing. Accordingly, we shall consider non-monetized spectrum sharing, happening directly between 
RANs of the operators.   
The interaction between self-interested players can be modeled by non-cooperative games, where players make 
decisions independently. A non-cooperative one-shot game formulation for unlicensed access was discussed in 
[8]. The players were not constrained by any rules, and freely selected power allocation strategies. When the 
inter-link interference is sufficiently low, the flat power allocation over all available channels represents the 
unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) for one-shot spectrum sharing games with complete opponent information. In 
multi-operator spectrum sharing, the utilities and strategies are player-specific, and not shared among players. 
There may also be a set of rules, either agreed among players or enforced by a legal entity. The strategic choices 
of the players are bound by these rules-no deviations from the rules are allowed. For instance, the legal 
framework governing the operation of different systems in license-exempt bands (e.g., WiFi and Zigbee) gives 
equal access rights to all radio devices when complying with certain power emission levels, spectral masks, 
channel reservation protocols, and activity rate in case of ISM bands. Considering long-term sharing in license-
exempt bands, repeated game strategies that lead to favorable NE were also discussed in [8]. These games have 
no a priori rules. It is assumed that nodes exchange information and agree in advance upon their operational 
points in terms of a power allocation across the shared frequency channels. The agreement is then enforced 
under the threat of punishment. Obviously, without exchanging information about network states and 
optimization objectives, it is not possible to identify and punish cheating, and cheating as such becomes ill-
defined. Thereby, in a co-primary spectrum sharing setting, the applicability of strategies based on concepts of 
dishonesty and punishment may be limited.  
Unlike spectrum sharing in license-exempt bands, where the number of players sharing spectral resources is 
indefinite, we consider a fixed and known number of players with publicly known and persistent identity. We 
assume no intra-RAN information exchange, except for limited message exchange among operators to realize 
spectrum negotiations. This requires a new interface, which may over-the-air, or over the core network. We 
design a coordination protocol for inter-operator spectrum sharing incorporating both operator strategies and 
spectrum sharing rules. The proposed protocol does not require a priori agreement about the operational points 
of different operators, but it leads to operational points which are better for all operators as compared to the case 
without spectrum usage coordination.  
II. System model 
This paper considers Co-Primary Spectrum Sharing among a limited number of co-located RANs belonging to 
different operators. The operators’ RANs are full cellular networks with multiple Base Stations (BSs). A 
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coordination protocol tailored for spectrum sharing in small cell networks is considered. At least in the first 
stage, it is not likely that macro-cells would participate in spectrum sharing. Only a part or cluster of the RAN 
may be involved in spectrum sharing, e.g., small cells of different operators located in the same building. Also, 
there are  
 
Figure 1: Elements in system functional architecture required for inter-operator spectrum sharing on the 
RAN level. 
no constraints regarding the deployment scenario. Small cells of different operators may offer high data rate 
services in different buildings, or they may have partially or fully overlapping service areas.  
For simplicity, we concentrate on a two-operator scenario. The operators are self-interested and not willing to 
share operator-specific information such as load, channel usage, nor CSI. An operator is unable to reliably 
estimate its opponent's optimization targets and network load from RAN measurements. As a first assumption 
we assume that an operator ignores the state of the other operator when negotiating the use of spectrum. The 
decision on spectrum usage of an operator is based on its own network state, such as network load, channel 
conditions, UEs’ locations, and interference caused by the opponent operator. Operators divide their spectrum 
into equal-size Component Carriers (CCs), and contribute to the spectrum sharing algorithm with an equal 
number of CCs. The transmit power that is used per CC is assumed constant, and spectrum sharing in the 
downlink is considered. This enables reliable estimation of interference caused by another operator. 
We adopt a simplified version of the ETSI Reconfigurable Radio Systems (RRS) functional architecture [9] for 
the considered Co-Primary Spectrum Sharing, see Fig. 1. The Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM) block is 
responsible for the short- and long-term management of spectrum. It decides spectrum usage and is engaged in 
the discovery of other operators by contacting external spectrum databases or repositories. The operators 
communicate only through their DSM. Coarse time synchronization is needed so that operators indicate their 
spectrum sharing proposals and decisions to each other almost simultaneously.  
The Radio Resource Management (RRM) block performs intra-RAN interference mitigation to utilize the 
limited radio-frequency resources as efficiently as possible. In addition, it supports inter-operator spectrum 
sharing by providing inter-operator interference measurements, carrier aggregation and strategic RRM 
functionality for negotiating spectrum with the other operator.  
III. Coordination protocols 
A coordination protocol is a mechanism to handle spectrum sharing negotiations between peer networks in 
inter-operator spectrum sharing. Such a coordination protocol requires: (i) A peer-to-peer connection between 
the operators, so that each operator can indicate its spectrum sharing proposals to the others; (ii) A set of 
decision rules determining the sharing outcome based on the operator proposals. These rules may, for instance, 
be agreed in advance between operators or enforced by an external regulator.  
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A. Spectrum sharing based on spectrum usage favors 
We assume that operators make proposals about how to share spectrum considering only their own interest, 
while also respecting a set of a priori spectrum sharing rules. A priori, the operators would be required to follow 
a specific MAC protocol.  For simplicity, we assume that operators involved in LSP have by regulation equal 
access rights over the pool, and an operator should always have the right to use the full spectrum pool if desired. 
We shall see that with a suitable coordination protocol, a rational operator may not always use the full spectrum 
pool. In MR, on the other hand, each operator has the legal right to access its own spectrum, and may also give 
rights to other operators to use it. Thus, under MR, an operator is entitled to use its own spectrum exclusively if 
it is convenient from its own perspective. Hereafter, the state that an operator can take at any time instant 
without breaking any rules is referred to as the fallback state.  
The coordination protocol is essentially a mechanism enabling the operator to determine the self-optimal way to 
use the spectrum at a particular time and announce it to the opponent. The opponent has the legal right to accept 
or reject the received proposal for spectrum usage. Any proposal that is accepted by the opponent necessitates a 
departure from the fallback state.  
With concave utility functions, an accepted spectrum sharing proposal reduces the instantaneous network utility 
of the opponent operator and provides some instantaneous gain in the network utility of the operator that made 
the proposal. An accepted proposal resulting in a deviation from the fallback state of the underlying MAC 
protocol can be seen as a spectrum usage favor because the opponent is aware of its utility loss. A spectrum 
usage favor is exchanged only if one operator asks for it and, simultaneously, the other operator is also willing 
to grant it. The operators are not forced to act. Spectrum sharing based on spectrum favors entails the benefits of 
opponent-blind operation, non-monetized spectrum use, and a few bits of inter-operator signaling per protocol 
time unit. 
Obviously, operators are not willing to accept everlasting performance loss in their network utilities from 
granting favors. The spectrum favors should be valid for a certain time period, agreed a priori between 
operators, and should be a part of the spectrum sharing rules in the coordination protocol. After the specified 
time period expires, the resource allocation must fall back to the state in which it was before granting the favor.  
While the operator taking a favor gets an instantaneous improvement in its network utility, it is not immediately 
clear what is the benefit for the operator that grants a favor. As operators are self-interested entities, they will 
not give favors for free: some sort of fairness should be maintained. Since we do not consider inter-operator 
monetary transactions, the benefits from granting a favor should lie in reciprocity. It is well-known from a game 
theoretic perspective, e.g., in the tit-for-tat strategy, that a player will be cooperative if and only if the opponent 
cooperates in return. A form of reciprocity could be, for instance, that both operators give and take an equal 
amount of equally-valuable spectrum favors.  
We discuss two coordination protocols that can be distinguished based on the reciprocity time-horizon. First, we 
consider the case of impatient operators that care only about instantaneous benefits. Then we focus on patient 
operators that are interested in long-term benefits. In both cases, we assume non-cooperative stage games played 
in sequence, with fixed action spaces and rules. The games are stochastic because the rewards at each stage 
depend on parameters governed by probability distributions, e.g., the network load, UE deployment and channel 
fading states. Rewards are computed with respect to the fallback state of the underlying spectrum sharing 
scenario. 
B. Instantaneous reciprocity  
When the operators are impatient, we can view each stage as a separate one-shot game in which reciprocity 
must be satisfied. Thus, each operator gives and takes an equal number of favors at each stage game. Since the 
operators are selfish, a favor is exchanged only if both operators experience a positive reward at that stage. 
Given the underlying spectrum sharing scenario, we next discuss strategies for the operators. The strategy is 
essentially the type of spectrum usage favor asked to the opponent. The target is to design strategies and 
spectrum sharing rules that result in favorable NE solutions. 
In MR, the strategy may correspond to the amount of its own licensed spectrum the operator would like to share 
with the opponent, whereas in LSP, the strategy may correspond to the fraction of the pool the operator would is 
willing not to use. Given the spectrum sharing scenario, the operators implement their strategies independently, 
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and exchange their proposals with the other players. After that, we need a suitable rule to resolve the spectrum 
sharing proposals submitted by the operators. One possibility is to select the minimum of them. Following this 
minimum rule, no operator will share more spectrum than desired under MR, whereas no operator will vacate 
more spectrum than desired under LSP. As a result, when an operator does not benefit from departing the 
fallback state, no favor is exchanged.  
For concave utilities, the one-shot game following the proposed minimum rule and strategies is characterized by 
a unique NE [10]. In [8], spectrum sharing in the power domain was considered, and it was shown that the NE 
in a one-shot game is trivial with equal power on all carriers. Here, the game takes place in frequency resources, 
and the resulting NE may depart from full sharing. The outcome approaches the result of the cooperative games 
of [6]. 
C. Long-term reciprocity 
Operators are expected to share spectrum for a long time. As an operator has a persistent and publicly known 
identity, the operators can learn from each other’s behavior. Accordingly, the interaction between operators 
could rather be modeled as a repeated non-cooperative game. In the repeated game, we need to keep a book of 
the favors exchanged because past rewards do impact future decisions. For symmetric operators, it is natural to 
assume that under long-term reciprocity, operators should give and take the same amount of equally valuable 
favors over some specified time horizon (or equivalently with some discount factor). The time horizon depends 
on the level of patience that operators have. Here, we consider infinitely patient operators.  
In a sequence of repeated interactions over a long-time horizon, self-interested operators with no information 
about the RANs of other operators can develop methods to ensure cooperative gains. For instance, operators 
may take advantage of uncorrelated load variations in their RANs. Then, an operator with a high instantaneous 
load may get spectrum usage favors from an opponent operator if the opponent happens to have low load. In the 
future, this operator will have the chance to return these favors to show its cooperative spirit and maintain 
reciprocity. Even though an operator experiences performance loss by granting a favor at a stage of the repeated 
game, when the load situation changes, it may get a performance gain that outweighs its past loss. While 
exchanging favors, each operator ensures that its expected gain is larger than its expected loss, thus benefiting 
when compared to the case where no favors are exchanged.  
In different spectrum sharing scenarios, different kinds of spectrum usage favors are asked and granted by 
operators. In LSP, we view a single type of favor - an operator asks the opponent for permission to use 
exclusively some resources from the pool. In MR, there can be bilateral agreements for resource utilization. In 
that case, there are two types of favors: (i) An operator asks the opponent for permission to start using jointly 
some of the resources of the opponent; (ii) an operator asks the opponent for permission to start using 
exclusively some of the resources of the opponent. 
Repeated games admit a large set of equilibrium points. Since the considered game is stochastic due to the time 
variation of network states, it is hard to analyze and find its NE. To proceed with analysis, we resort to heuristic 
strategies attempting to obtain long-term reciprocity. This can be done with a threshold-based approach.                              
We assume that an operator knows the Probability Distribution Functions (PDFs) of its utility gains and losses. 
A simple long-term reciprocal strategy would be that an operator asks for a favor if its immediate utility gain is 
higher than a threshold θg, and grants a favor (upon asked) if its immediate utility loss is smaller than another 
threshold θl. These decision thresholds depend not only on the current network state and the gain and loss 
statistics, but also on the sequence of previous interactions with opponent operators. The thresholds for Operator 
A would be coupled to the probabilities of Operator B to grant and ask favors, so that long-term reciprocity is 
achieved. Details for setting the decision threshold in the case of a LSP can be found in [11]. The proposed 
heuristic strategy performs strictly better than the strategy that does not involve the exchange of favors. Unlike 
the one-shot game, where an operator takes and gives favors simultaneously, we simplify the repeated game by 
assuming that no action is taken when both operators ask a favor at the same stage of the game. 
D. Combined coordination protocol 
In Co-Primary small cell deployments, the interference conditions and the RAN load are expected to vary 
significantly. When UEs are located close to their serving BSs and, as a consequence, the inter-operator 
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interference is small, and both operators would be eager to share spectrum. On the other hand, when UEs are 
exposed to high inter-operator interference, the operators would prefer to orthogonalize their resources. 
Furthermore, patient operators would be willing to empty spectrum resources when they have few or no UEs to 
serve, and request more spectrum resources when they really need them.  
 
Figure 2: Visualizing the functionality of the proposed coordination protocol based on the combined 
short-term and long-term reciprocity over four stage games. 
Irrespectively of the spectrum sharing scenario, the one-shot game adapts spectrum sharing to the inter-operator 
interference conditions. However, the outcome of the one-shot game does not depend on the RAN load 
variations. This is where repeated games can come into play by allocating more spectrum to the operator with 
higher load, provided that this operator has been cooperative in the past. We thus consider a combined protocol 
where in each instance of the game operators first exchange spectrum usage favors based on short-term 
reciprocity to adapt to the inter-operator interference situation, and then exchange favors based on long-term 
reciprocity, to exploit network traffic dynamics. The functionality of the proposed coordination protocol is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
IV. Numerical illustrations 
We study the UE rate improvement for operators applying spectrum sharing coordination protocols in an MR 
scenario. We consider an indoor deployment with two LTE small cell operators in a single-story 50x50 m
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building, see Fig. 3. The building has four identical rooms, and an operator’s BSs are stationed in diagonal 
rooms. We consider downlink transmissions, a proportionally fair utility function for both operators and a full 
buffer traffic model. Thus the number of UEs represents the network load, which is generated from a Poisson 
distribution with possibly different means for different operators. The UEs are uniformly distributed in the 
service area of operators. Cell association is based on received signal power. 
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Figure 3: Indoor inter-operator deployment scenario. Different colors represent BSs of different 
operators. 
 
Figure 4: Strategy profile for Operator A. 
We consider the WINNER indoor office propagation channel model [12]. A bandwidth of 80 MHz is split into 
four CCs, with each operator owning an exclusive license for two CCs. The available power budget per CC is 
20 dBm, and the aggregate external interference plus noise level per CC is -80 dBm. Each operator contributes a 
CC to the spectrum sharing game and reserves the other for its own exclusive usage. Fig. 4 depicts the strategy 
profile for Operator A. 
At each stage game, operators first play the one-shot game and select strategy (1) or (2) in Fig. 4. Based on the 
minimum rule, the outcome with the least carrier sharing is selected. For instance, the outcome of the one-shot 
game is (2) only if both operators propose to share a CC. When one or both operators are unwilling to share a 
CC, the outcome is (1). Next, the repeated game is executed. For example, if the outcome of the one-shot game 
is (2) and Operator A asks for an exclusive favor of two CCs from Operator B, which Operator B grants, the 
result is (2c).  
We evaluate the performance of the combined coordination protocol over a finite time horizon of 4000 stage 
games. First we consider a scenario with equal mean network loads between the operators and low inter-
operator interference. The coverage areas are non-overlapping; the UEs are served by a BS in the same room, as 
in Fig. 3. The mean number of UEs for each operator is 5 and the wall loss is 10 dB.  
In Fig. 5, the rate distribution for the UEs of an operator is depicted. The QoS with sharing is significantly better 
than without. The rate improvement in 10th percentile of rate Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) is 47% 
and in 50th-percentile is 45%. The full spectrum sharing outcome (2a) is most likely. This is the ideal solution 
in a low interference environment. The gains of the combined protocol and the one-shot scheme are virtually the 
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same. Only few favors are exchanged during the repeated game as the operators’ loads are similar. In addition, 
the outcome of a fully cooperative protocol is depicted, where the operation of the two networks is jointly 
optimized. The full cooperation results do not differ from those of the coordination protocol. 
Next, we analyze a situation with load asymmetry and high inter-operator interference. The UEs of both 
operators are distributed uniformly in the whole building with no internal walls. In half of the instances, the 
mean number of UEs is 8 for Operator A and 2 for Operator B, whereas in the other half, the loads are reversed.  
In Fig. 6, we see a decline in UE rate in comparison to Fig. 5 due to intense inter-operator interference. One-shot 
sharing provides a small rate improvement.  However, the gain is less prominent than in Fig. 5. A marginal 
improvement of 1% in the 10th percentile UE rate is seen, and an increment of 8% in the 50th-percentile. In the 
combined coordination protocol, Operator B grants more favors than Operator A when it has low load, as it can 
cope with fewer CCs. When it has high load, it asks and is granted for more favors. The overall performance is 
better than for the one-shot game.  The 10th percentile UE rate is improved by 26% and the 50th percentile rate 
by 23% compared to no sharing. The combined coordination protocol performs close to a fully cooperative joint 
optimization of the networks. 
 
Figure 5: Rate distribution for the UEs of an operator. Equal mean network load for the two operators, 
low inter-operator interference. 
In the simulation setting, UEs with low rate in no sharing are UEs in a high-load instance that are far from the 
serving BS and accordingly close to an opponent BS. These UEs do not benefit from the one-shot game, as they 
do not benefit from shared spectrum. However, the repeated game can provide more resources to these UEs, and 
accordingly a better rate. On the contrary, UEs that experience a high rate in no sharing are UEs close to the 
serving BS, and accordingly far from opponent BSs. These UEs are low-interference UEs that benefit from 
shared spectrum provided by the one-shot game, whereas the repeated game has little effect on their 
performance.  
V. Conclusions 
The principle of allocating spectrum to mobile network operators based on a dedicated and exclusive license 
will persist, as a method to ensure coverage and Quality of Service. Nevertheless, the high capacity demands 
generated in hot spot areas require heterogeneous network structures. Operation of small cell networks only 
based on dedicated licenses may not be feasible as more spectrum is needed and new spectrum is expensive and 
difficult to identify. Flexible spectrum use and co-primary spectrum access is a way forward for indoor small 
cells. Different operators providing wireless data access in spatially separated indoor areas, or with highly 
directive millimeter wave technologies, may benefit from spectrum sharing due to negligible inter-operator 
interference. The spectrum needs for such operators would vary in space. With overlapping coverage areas, 
inter-operator interference may be significant, especially for centimeter-wave and lower frequencies. Load 
variations and changing user locations make this interference highly variable in small cell networks, so that 
spectrum needs  of  
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Figure 6: Rate distribution for the UEs of an operator. Unequal mean network loads for the two operators, 
high inter-operator interference. 
operators would vary in space and time. In order to exploit variations in spectrum needs, inter-operator spectrum 
sharing is a viable option. To realize it, we need a coordination protocol that has low implementation 
complexity, is transparent to the operator’s revenue model and does not require excessive information exchange 
among operators. Such a protocol would also enable the emergence of new types of market players, e.g., local 
operators. We have designed a protocol that adapts spectrum allocation to inter-operator interference situations 
and network traffic dynamics which are expected to be prominent is small cells. We illustrated that in an indoor 
deployment scenario, two operators are both able to offer higher user rates than they could without coordination. 
Our results show that a rational operator, knowing that the opponent is rational and has a network with similar 
characteristics, has incentive to coordinate the spectrum usage. Beyond improvements in service rates, there are 
other issues that can influence operators’ incentives to cooperate, such as the fact the service quality is a key 
way operators attempt to differentiate themselves from their competitors. The discussed protocol can be used in 
any spectrum reserved for mobile communication, for example in Licensed Shared Access [13] spectrum. 
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